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Monetary Control Act (MCA) enacted by Congress in March 1930 will significantly affect the competitive environment in which financial institutions operate. This act broadens both the asset and liability powers of savings and loan associations (S&Ls), mutual savings banks and credit unions, opening opportunities for these institutions that traditionally have been limited to banks. In light of these new powers and the increasing erosion of both legal and economic differences between thrift institutions and banking organizations, thrifts have become important competitors in markets for banking services -especially for transaction or checking accounts.
1 Logically, the presence of thrift institutions should carry greater weight in analysis of mergers between commercial banks and acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies (BHCs).
The following discussion reviews several provisions of the MCA that permit more intense bank-thrift competition, describes the current approach used by banking regulatory agencies to review applications for approval of bank mergers and BHC acquisitions, and discusses its validity in light of the new legislation. Finally, the article discusses some alternative approaches to the analysis of competition in local markets.
THE MCA PROVISIONS
The distinctions between thrifts and banks have become less rigid because of a long list of recent finant The term "thrift institutions" ia this article is defined as sayings and loan associations, credit unions and mutual savings banks.
cial innovations and the geographic expansion of socalled "non-banking" institutions.
2 The MCA, in response to these developments, reduces even further the actual differences between banks and thrifts, Regulations that have attempted to control or constrain pricing and portfolio decisions of financial institutions are being liberalized, In essence, the act provides for a greater reliance on market forces to determine both the flow of deposits to financial institutions and the flow of credit from these institutions to borrowers. The major elements of the MCA that will affect bankthrift competition are listed in table 1.Ã n important change is the authorization of interestearning "transaction" accounts at both banks and thrifts. This is achieved through the nationwide legalization of negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts and credit union share drafts.
4 In some areas of the country (especially New England), depository in- ATS and NOW accounts represent a type of individual "checking" account. By providing for the automatic transfer of funds from a savings account to cover checks drawn against a zerobalance ATS account, individuals can earn interest on "checking" balances. NOW accounts are interest-eaming savings accounts against which customers call write "negotiable drafts." Similarly, credit union share drafts permit payable drafts drawn on a credit union member's interest-earning share account. Share drafts, which resemble checks, are processed through the credit union's account at a commercial bank. stitutions had already offered interest-earning transaction accounts since the early l970s. Accompanying these powers is the provision for the gradual phaseout of deposit interest rate ceilings.
In addition to these significant changes, the MCA allows S&Ls to engage in consumer lending, trust activities and credit card operations. The MCA authorizes thrifts to invest in, sell, or hold commercial paper and corporate debt securities (up to 20 percent of assets). Limited business and commercial loan powers have also been granted to federally chartered mutual savings banks.
The basic findings of the act are that the existing institutional structure has discouraged persons from saving, created inequities for depositors, impeded the ability of depository institutions to compete for funds and failed to achieve an even flow of funds among institutions. The act also states that all depositors are entitled to receive a market rate of return on their savings.
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Credit market activity of thrifts over the past decade has developed by piecemeal expansion; these institutions evolved originally as special-purpose institutions whose asset-liability powers have been extended only by gaining legislative approval.
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CURRENT METHOD OF ANALYZING

COMPETITION
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 requires the Federal Reserve to consider the likely effects of proposed holding company formations and acquisitions on competition, the convenience and needs of the communities involved, and the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the institulions involved.
6 If the Board of Governors finds that a transaction will substantially lessen competition (or tend to create a monopoly or be in restraint of trade), the Board must deny the application unless the anticompetitive effects are judged to be clearly outweighed by "the convenience and needs of the community."
Legal Doctrine
The critical problem in antitrust law is selecting the specific industry and industry output (or '<line of commerce") to use in analyzing competition between firms. In analyzing cases under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve has generally chosen "commercial banking" to be the relevant line of commerce. This definition is based on the Supreme Court's controversial Philadelphia National Bank since only they can legally accept demand deposits. In addition, banks were said to enjoy "settled consumer preferences" for full-service banking. Thus, the "general store" nature of the banking business made it a distinct line of commerce, distinguishing banks from other financial institutions.
Banking agencies have relied on simple market share tests to judge the likely effects of mergers or BHC acquisitions on competition, using "concentration ratios" as a form of prima facie evidence of these effects on competition. A concentration ratio is a summary measure intended to represent the degree of market power that larger firms possess.
8 This ratio is defined as the percentage of total industry activity (measured by output, employment, assets, etc.) accounted for by the larger firms. A four-firm concentration ratio (using total deposits as a proxy for output) for all the commercial banks in a local banking market, for example, may be 75 percent; that is, the four largest banks hold 75 percent of the total bank deposits in this market.°A lthough other factors are analyzed in evaluating the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions, concentration ratios continue to be the main factors in such analysis.'°The important issue is that the calculation of concentration ratios using commercial bank organization deposit data alone accepts the Court's by the Justice Department in 1968 which are frequently cited in bank merger and acquisition analysis. These guidelines indicate that the department will challenge a horizontal merger between firms in a concentrated industry (i.e., one with a four-firm concentration ratio greater than 75~) when the following market shares are involved:
Acquiring line of commerce definition and assumes that the aggregate of the many products and services supplied by banks represents a meaningful product line for analysis of market competition.' 1
Economic Analysis of Line of Commerce Definition
The definition adopted by the Court in 1963 was based on a particular view of the market for bank services: namely, that many bank products are demanded jointly. In other words, it is possible to identify "clusters" or "bundles" of services demanded by customers for which banks compete.'
2 Such demand may result because of transportation costs and transaction costs (including the cost of obtaining information) which makes it costly or impractical for customers to deal with more than one institution.
Banks, however, compete in many different product markets and in different geographic market areas. Commercial banks participate principally in markets for financial assets. Banks demand customer deposits which they invest in a variety of earning assets. Customers using demand accounts are, in turn, supplied a transaction service. Customers holding time deposits are provided an intermediation service -funds are invested in interest-earning assets, Banks also supply various types of credit, trust services, safe deposit services, correspondent services, etc. Each of these activities can be identified as an individual "output" of a bank. One can argue that each "output" is sold in 11 The use of such concentration ratios is not necessarily ad hoc.
Their use has both theoretical and empirical support in the literature. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the use of such ratios, essentially a result of data scarcity, has unfortunately guided research efforts as well. i2~4~alternative argument holds that banks have offered diverse services in the past because they have been prohibited from paying interest on demand deposits since 1933.
Customers holding large demand deposit balances receive "implicit interest" in the form of other services offered below cost to depositors. In other words, competition resulted in institutions, faced with prohibition on direct payment of interest, offering implicit interest in the form of services, such as low or zero service charges, drive-in facilities, branches, and occasionally gifts (porcelain china, silverware and calculators, for example).
a distinct market defined in terms of specific groups of buyers (for example, by location of customer, or maturity and denomination of the particular loan). Therefore, choosing the appropriate measure of bank "output" is a difficult task.' 3
The above reasoning suggests that the usefulness of the line of commerce definition adopted in the Philadelphia case should be determined on empirical grounds. Although the "department store" or "cluster of service" approach may be valid in some instances, the concept is completely irrelevant for many readily identifiable bank "products." For example, an individual seeking a mortgage loan will choose an institution primarily on the basis of the price of the loan (the interest rate); the package of other services offered by competing institutions is not pertinent in this decision.
Measuring the extent of competition between different types of institutions in a product line must be based upon the degree of substitution between products of these institutions. In economic terms, the important issue is the magnitude of the "cross-elasticity" of demand between individual products offered by financial institutions." The higher the cross-elasticity between the products of banks and thrifts, the greater the substitution and the stronger the argument for including the outputs of these institutions in the same industry or the same product line. The cluster approach used by the Supreme Court assumes that the degree of substitution between lines of commerce (thrift output and bank output) is "small." For example, if institution A (say, a thrift) increases the (explicit or implicit) interest rate on savings deposits while institution B (a bank) keeps its rates unchanged, the volume of business transferred by local customers from bank B to thrift A rises with the magnitude of the cross-elasticity of supply. The other 1981 services offered by bank B (for example, checking services), however, may preclude a significant transfer of business between institutions. Since both thrifts and banks can now offer transaction accounts, the degree of substitution between their respective outputs will increase. 15
Bank regulatory agencies have emphasized the "locally limited" customer in analysis of bank mergers and acquisitions. As such, regulators have tended to stress the services provided to individuals and small business customers. Since most large commercial and industrial customers have access to national and regional markets, competition for these accounts is intense. Empirical estimates of the relevant crosselasticities for retail and small business customers in local banking markets, however, are difficult to obtain. Regulatory ceilings on interest rates interfere with obtaining good estimates of these magnitudes. As previously mentioned, competitive forces have resulted in institutions competing by means other than the payment of explicit rates of interest. Institutions located in different market environments offer differentiated clusters of outputs. Differing degrees of branching restrictions across governmental jurisdictions, for example, may affect the form of implicit interest paid to consumers.
Even before the MCA, other structural changes since the last Supreme Court ruling on a merger case (1974) had cast doubt on the validity of the banking regulatory agencies' approach to competition. The asset and deposit liability growth of thrifts has outpaced that of banks over most of the periods from 1960-79 (tables 2 and 3). It is unlikely that the previous degree of substitution between the outputs of banks and thrifts has remained constant since the Philadelphia definition in 1963. Retail customers in local banking markets have reacted to significant financial developments in the 1970s. Inflation, interest rate ceilings, and new instruments such as money market certificates, money market funds, ATS accounts and telephone transfer accounts, have all contributed to an increased degree of substitution between services offered by banks and non-bank institutions. The nationwide legalization of thrift transaction accounts further weakens the argument that banks have a clear advantage in attracting customers. The "cross-elasticity" of demand is defined as a measure of the relationship between the demand for one firm's output when the price of another firm's output changes (when all other things remain the same). The cross-elasticity between goods 1 and 2 is given by the equation = % change in quantity of good I demanded e %change in price of good 2
If e is less than zero, the outputs are normally considered "complements." If e is greater than zero they are considered substitutes. The degree of substitution can he gauged l,y the ma~iitude of this coefficient: higher positive cross-elasticity coefficients correspond to greater degrees of substitution. 
Legal Issues
Connecticut, that point may well he reached when and if savings banks become significant participants
The Supreme Court case that most recently adin the marketing of hank services to commercial dressed the relevance of thrifts in competitive analyenterprises. But, in adherence to the tests set forth sis was the Connecticut National Bank case in 1974.17 in onr earlier bank merger cases, . . such a point
has not yet been reached? 8
A lower court had found that savings banks were "fierce competitors" of banks in certain markets, The The Court's emphasis on competition for commerSupreme Court, however, reaffirmed the line of comcial business has led some analysts to speculate that, merce definition adopted in the Philadelphia case, even with the passage of the MCA, thrifts will still maintaining that commercial banks offer a unique he excluded from the Federal Reserve's competitive cluster of services that distinguish them from other analysis of mergers and acquisitions. Indeed, the quaninstitutions. The Court in particular emphasized that titative impact of the new law is greater with respect there was a lack of significant competition between to the array of services offered to retail customers. All banks and mutual savings banks for commercial depository institutions in the nation may offer NOW accounts, accounts, but not to commercial and business enter- extend business loans (up to 5 percent of total assets) to firms within 75 miles of their main office, but since most mutual savings banks are located in the East, their competitive impact will be limited to eastern markets. Likewise, the commercial lending authority granted to mutual savings banks applies only to savings banks with federal charters. In addition, expanded services to corporations would remain generally unavailable from S&Ls. The MCA, however, permits Federal S&Ls to invest in commercial paper and corporate debt securities (up to 20 percent of assets).
Whether these specific changes will be sufficient to alter the line of commerce definition in court cases is an unsettled issue. Although the competitive impact of the MCA on competition for commercial customers may not be viewed as substantial in quantitative terms, any marginal increases must be considered significant since these new powers allow additional entrants into markets for these services.
SOME ALTEIIT4AT1VES
Many analysts believe that a different approach to the analysis of competition among depository institutions is called for.
2°T o a limited degree, banking authorities have already begun to introduce the influence of thrifts into their analysis.ui The question still remains, however, how the impact of increasing thrift competition should be weighted in the analysis. In other words, how would the line of commerce be "unbundled?" Should commercial banks, mutual savings banks and S&Ls together encompass a line of commerce, or should individual product markets of these institutions be analyzed? Several options are available.
Add Thrifts to Line of Commerce
Framework
One alternative is simply to include thrift institutions as direct competitors of banks; in other words, treat thrifts as commercial banks for purposes of a line of commerce definition. Concentration ratios would continue to be the most likely candidates as the key proxies for measuring competition under such an approach. Including thrifts into the analysis would liberalize merger and acquisition policy to some degree. Since concentration ratios would be diluted by deposits or assets of thrifts, the number of possible bank mergers meeting the Justice Department's current merger and acquisition "standards" would be increased. 22
Unfortunately, this approach suffers from the same flaws that exist with the general use of "commercial banking" as a line of commerce definition. Because significant differences exist in the asset and liability powers between banks and thrifts, competition varies across relevant product lines. Likewise, the varying forms of financial structure observed among geographic areas of the country (location of mutual savings banks in the East and different thrift and bank branching laws across states, for instance) make such concentration ratios difficult to apply consistently.
Maintaining the line of commerce framework by including thrifts but continuing to rely on aggregated market share statistics also suffers from major economic flaws. As argued above, the relevant crosselasticities among products of banks and thrifts have been altered by changes in technology and a great number of financial innovations in recent years. Likewise, as regulations on interest rate ceilings are removed over the next six years, financial institutions will undoubtedly "unbundle" their own services. Competition among institutions will result in independently priced services and these prices will more closely approximate the marginal costs of their provision.
Maintain Current Approach With "Subjective" Addition of Thrifts
Another alternative is to maintain the current approach of including only banks in concentration analysis, except in cases where thrifts are seen as "significant competitors." In such cases, thrifts would be used in calculating market share data. In essence, this is the approach that the banking regulatory authorities are now using and, given the uncertainties of the MCA's impact, is the likely route they will follow during a transition period. This methodology provides enough flexibility to accommodate regional differences in market structure, but is not likely to be legally satisfying given its subjective framework. In addition, it suffers from the same problems as the current line of commerce definition of lumping together the many outputs of banks and thrifts into one aggregate measure.
Unbundle Financial institution Products
A third alternative, more consistent with economic theory, is to disaggregate the traditional line of commerce (defined as commercial banking) into specific subcategories. Though this strategy would more accurately reflect the actual competitive situation, it would increase the difficulty of assessing the impact on "overall" competition. Regulators would first be faced with the problem of assigning weights to the competitive effects of a merger or acquisition across product lines. Since institutions are multi-product producers, it is possible that competition among firms may be lessened for some outputs but not for others. For example, two local banks proposing to merge might produce a monopoly on local trust services but still generate vigorous competition with many other financial institutions for checking and savings deposits. Depending on the relative weights assigned to the competitive effects across product lines (which would continue to be measured by concentration ratios), the disaggregated product approach might result in a more restrictive stance against mergers and acquisitions.
A second limitation to the disaggregation approach is the lack of detailed statistics measuring some product lines. Each product line might correspond to a different geographic market. Correspondent banking services, for example, would have to be analyzed in terms of larger geographic regions (e.g., a state), whereas small business loans would be analyzed within a more localized market. One would have to identify both customers of such product lines and the financial institutions offering close substitutes for this approach. Practical data problems would therefore limit the degree of disaggregation possible.
CONCLUSION
Although Supreme Court cases to date have consistently upheld "commercial banking" as a distinct line of commerce definition in bank merger cases, the foundation of the Court's reasoning has eroded since 1963. Significant market changes since the last Supreme Court case (1974) cast doubt on the practice of evaluating mergers and acquisitions as narrowly as the traditional analysis requires.
With the passage of the Monetary Control Act, there is greater reason to depart from the established tradition of treating commercial banking as an exclusive line of commerce in antitrust analysis. A more broadly defined line of commerce would increase the number of mergers and acquisition proposals meeting antitrust standards. On the other hand, a disaggregated approach to analyzing the product lines of banks and thrifts would more accurately scrutinize proposals for actual anticompetitive effects. Such changes in product and geographic market definitions will have important implications for the future structure and competitive performance of the financial industry. Although the proper analytic approach is still evolving, increased thrift competition will certainly play a more significant role in the evaluation of future bank mergers and BHC acquisition proposals.
